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1During the last decade or so, there has 
been mounting dissatisfaction with the ex-
tremes of the linguistic turn. The kind of 
“textualism” derived from literary theory
readings of Derrida (most famously by the 
“Yale school”) that subscribe to “the endless
play of signifiers” with no contact point be-
yond language – that, to use the words of 
Mark Bevir, deny even “a provisional halt
to the process of interpretation”1 – seems 
ill-suited to historical studies. Even more
moderate appeals to textualism seem to
introduce as many problems as they solve. 
Following the overwhelming acceptance of 
the “linguistic turn” in historical theory, his-
tory has increasingly come to be viewed
as a second-order literary pursuit (think 
especially of readings of Hayden White’s 
and Keith Jenkins’ work); the conclusion
for many is that history is a form of liter-
ary creation for the less talented. History is 
thus less often set in opposition against lit-
erature (the opposition of fact and fiction) 
than it is compared to it when discussing
the finer points of particular representa-
tional strategies assumed.2 Hence, per-
haps, the practical or “historical turn”,3 or 
even an “empirical turn”,4 by those more
historically minded. In this situation, one of
the main challenges in historical theory is
to retain the achievements of the linguistic
turn concerning ideology and power while
defining what history’s particular role and 
legitimate applications might be – without
ending up with a valorisation of endless in-
terpretations or the return to naive empir-
icism. Success in this might help salvage
history from both servitude to ideology and
complete meaninglessness. Of course, this 
is not a task for theorists alone.
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In his final chapter to In 1926 – nicely entitled “After Learning from History” – Hans Ulrich Gum-
brecht notes that it is time “at least for professional historians, to respond seriously to a situation 
in which the claim that ‘one can learn from history’ has lost its persuasive power”.5 He continues: 
“To respond seriously to this change would mean that professional historians . . . would have to
begin thinking about its consequences – without being apologetic, and without feeling obliged to 
prove wrong those who, never expecting to learn from history, have no use for all the knowledge 
about the past that we preserve, publish and teach.” Responding “seriously” in this way to the 
abandonment of history’s didactic function as justification for “doing history” is a challenge that 
should unite historians and theorists rather than create dissent. How, after all, can either group 
neglect the fact that history continues to be produced and consumed with no other remaining
justifications than its institutional position and its utility as a pastime? Certainly rescuing history 
by redefining its purpose has been the driving force behind the work of many contemporary the-
orists (most notably, I would say, Hayden White, despite some interpretations to the contrary).6
So, why history?
2
If nothing else, the questions “Why history?” or “What is history for?” can provide justification for 
contemporary historical theory: if we were to assume a thoroughly empiricist, “objective” ap-
proach to history, the question might easily appear superfluous. History could simply be justified
in terms of its telling us things about the past that would reveal how things really were and thus, 
on top of providing answers to questions regarding causes and effects as well as explanations
for various phenomena, show us how we might better conduct ourselves in order to achieve or 
avoid whatever situations we find desirable or undesirable. History would be able to teach us
essential lessons about the world and its pragmatic occupation.
While we (that is most historians and theorists) have successfully distanced ourselves from the 
speculative history dimension of claims regarding history’s lessons, these old sentiments do seem 
to persist even in so-called lower-case, avowedly objectivist histories. They cause, moreover, con-
tinuing difficulties: for those of us who embrace the provisional and constructed nature of historical 
interpretation, the question of history’s purpose gives occasion for “presentist” speculation. And 
this is perceived – correctly – as hostile to empiricist, institutionally dominant historical research. In 
other words, as long as empiricism is seen as a cure-all for contrived, linguistically plagued theo-
ries, saying that history provides knowledge that can be used for social purposes is perfectly ac-
ceptable. Saying the same thing while doubting the infallibility of history makes the claim suspect 
even for hardline empiricists, however. Indeed, it appears that history cannot be used in identical 
ways if one’s beliefs regarding it are different. This may simply be a matter of the way “the political” 
is introduced into the equation; the unsavoury flavour brought by the use of instrumental terms; 
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as in the insistence that we need to use history rather than simply allow “truth” to speak for itself.
Of course, there are also more credible arguments than the worn-out “those who do not know 
history are doomed to repeat it”, for instance: history encourages self-reflection. Or, history pro-
vides us with opportunities to experience vicariously things not present in our life-worlds. These 
are the kinds of arguments where the concreteness of the past and its representations seem to 
offer at least some privilege. And they are the ones, I think, to try to run with.
But then the question becomes: what of literature and film, for instance? Why reject the claim
that other imaginaries can provide the same “knowledge” without the discomfort incurred by his-
tory’s referential difficulties?7 Firstly, I would say, attending to history can be justified in terms of
the strength of the historical imagination in some people as well as the way in which the con-
creteness of the past can compel self-reflection in a different register to encounters with the
“merely” imaginary. And secondly: in addition to lending support to the status quo, history can
also provide a space for critique. The bracketing of “real” reference too easily turns us from the 
world to ourselves, from “politics” (serious engagement) to entertainment. I will examine this 
issue of critique first.
3
As I see it, there are two main obstacles to critical historiography. The first is the traditional em-
phasis on “objectivity” and “science”. On this view, history should not be rhetorical or political
but should rather exhibit openness to its subject of study, research conducted in a spirit of ob-
jectivity ensured by rigid methodological strictures. (This question has been so much debated
already that I won’t attempt to say much about it here.) The second, equally insidious, obstacle 
comes quite paradoxically from attempts at tempering the extremes brought by viewing history 
as science in this strict way. This second obstacle to critical historiography lies in the so-called
universalisation of difference – in epistemological relativism as expanded and accepted to the 
extent that no positions can be unproblematically endorsed over others. Here historical repre-
sentation has come to be seen as thoroughly rhetorical and political, and all noninstitutional,
nonpolitical grounds for determining its value have been rejected. This is what I like to call our 
“turn” to entertainment.
It seems to me that this second difficulty is the one that currently warrants the attention of his-
torical theory. After all, the debate over objectivity has arrived at a deadlock, with both historians
and theorists simply reiterating familiar positions.
Importantly, I believe, the turn to entertainment has been inspired more by the refusal of theory
to offer prescriptive rules for historians to follow than by the critique of objectivity. Yet there is
an obvious reason for this reticence to prescribe. The only way to continue the line of argument 
that constructivism sets us on in a prescriptive way is to abandon history as a specific form of 
knowledge and turn it into trope, language, rhetoric, literature, politics and so on. Abandoning
the scientific aspiration of history in this way results in admitting that it is just another imagi-
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nary, a tool for shaping the world in ways that have subjective appeal for a particular historian.
So, are there no mediating positions to be had? Of course there are, but no fully comfortable ones 
in terms of systematic argumentation: The only way to escape from this either–or is to relin-
quish the need for system and accept the “outsideness” of morality to science in the way done by 
Richard Rorty and Jacques Derrida, for example. (In this way, poststructuralist philosophy gets 
around the problem by presenting its ethics on pragmatic rather than philosophical grounds.)
Obviously there is no absolute way to justify a particular ethical or political choice; thus, what is 
important to realise is that the demand for such justification within science is a needless one. In 
history, this point, too, has been well-argued in the work of Hayden White, Frank Ankersmit and 
Keith Jenkins, to name just a prominent few.8
To arrive at any functioning history that does not adopt either the extreme of “objective science” 
or that of “history as fiction”, theoretical discomfort must be endured. Only in this discomfort can 
critical historiography be discovered.
4
Critical historiography obviously has a market and demand today. Think of the reception of 
Michael Moore’s documentary films, for example; interestingly, the differences between such
“infotainment” and the kinds of interventions in historical representation that Hayden White calls 
for in his essay on the “modernist event” appear nonexistent.9 Even the temporal distance that 
historians traditionally demanded between observer and the observed event has been erased
in contemporary practice within institutional historiography – indeed, even more so here than 
in popular forms, perhaps, since “history” still means the distant past in popular conceptualisa-
tions whereas current historiography seems to be increasingly concerned also with more re-
cent phenomena.
Yet, how justified is my claim concerning a “turn” to entertainment? Is there any point in saying 
that we presently live in an “entertainment age”? Understood in terms of irony regarding truth, 
even at the highest levels, it certainly seems to be quite an accurate representation. Ascertain-
ing truth does not appear to be a central goal for politics, for example. Instead, for many, there 
is a focus on effects – we already believe we have a sufficient grasp of how things are and the 
aim is to implement a particular personal vision in and onto the world. Speaking of this in terms 
of entertainment may seem callous, but that is not my intention. The reference to entertainment 
is, rather, a reference to some of the ways in which we interact with the world: the expectation 
of quick gratification, the ease with which rhetoric defeats the withholding of judgement, the 
unassailability of subjective beliefs, and so on. Most centrally, the reference to entertainment is 
meant to signify the kind of attitude where justification and approval for one’s actions are more 
important than the reasons for them. Public intentions thus become more important than ac-
tual goals or effects.
For immediate purposes, this kind of interpretation of publicity and attention to effects serves
to highlight an interesting transformation within history and historical theory: where the original 
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emphasis of linguistic constructivism was clearly political in that it provided a means to question 
authoritative interpretations when necessary, the more avant-garde branches of constructivist
theorising and “historicising” now focus on the ways in which representation can create experi-
ence – in other words, on the extent to which it can stimulate and entertain. Now, this is not to 
say that the creation of emotional involvement in readers or viewers is unimportant – far from 
it. Rather, the intention is to point out that the original critical motivation behind the emphasis on 
history as involving literary creation has been lost in some areas (while the whole debate is stub-
bornly refused in others, of course): instead, the goal de jour has been to make “history” more 
appealing in form; more appealing for consumption as opposed to reflection. Experimentation
has been fuelled as much (and in some cases more) by innovative forms and subject matter be-
ing perceived as values in themselves, as by the desire to rethink history specifically as history. 
Of course, this is still not necessarily a bad thing since results are more important than inten-
tions in defining institutional change of this kind – in other words, in redefining what history is.
5
Indeed, there are even benefits to be had from making history sexier. If it fails to interest and in-
volve readers, there is little point to it in terms of critical engagement. Again, infotainment serves
well to illustrate the benefits to be had from this kind of appeal. At the same time, if the em-
phasis on textualism and entertaining is taken too far and history is seen as only one imaginary
among others, its status as at least aspiring to knowledge (“knowledge” understood in a post-
foundational sense, of course) is compromised and its value as critique is undermined to much 
the same extent. Another benefit – albeit again subject to much theoretical discomfort – is the
way it allows us to devote attention to the dimension of experience.
Drawing attention to the issue of experience, Gumbrecht writes:
[W]hat could be the point of so much insistence on the unbridgeable distance that sepa-
rates us from past worlds if it were not the desire to re-present – to make present again 
– those past worlds? Historical culture cannot avoid living between its endeavor to ful-
fill such desire for presence and an awareness that this is an impossible self-assign-
ment . . . Yet as soon as historical culture openly opts for this desire for re-presenta-
tion . . . it cannot help being ironic, for it then re-presents the past as a “reality” though it 
knows that all re-presentations are simulacra.10
Yet Gumbrecht’s solution seems too limited. While he quite rightly turns attention to the moti-
vation for historical research, the “desire for historical reality”,11 we should note that this desire
is only part of the story: as self-reflection is only a part of the feeling of agency, so motivation
and intention are only part of the process of historical representation. Of course, since Gumbre-
cht wrote this essay, the “direct experience of the past”12 (which the desire for historical reality is 
ultimately directed at) has become an extremely fashionable topic even among theorists of his-
tory and history culture.13 It might indeed now be safe to say that acknowledging historians’ (and 
some theorists’) “desire” for presence is not enough in compensating for the problems with the 
turn to entertainment. What needs to be done, rather, is to examine the needs underlying this
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desire for presence, experience, or re-presentation. This can, to me, be most usefully addressed
in terms of self-reflection and agency. This is where the difficulties with irony and entertainment 
may be better dealt with.
6
Contemporary irony as it appears in political practice and its reception can quite usefully be 
viewed as a perversion of the poststructuralist dictum to always question. Whether there is a di-
rect relation between these phenomena or not, it is clear that the textualist variant of poststruc-
turalism with its emphasis on play is something that has practical parallels in many areas, not 
only in political rhetoric and certainly not only within literary studies and the humanities. Indeed, 
this kind of “play” would seem to mark most of our contemporary attitudes. Having said this, 
there is an important distinction that needs to be made between irony in this sense and relativ-
ism or epistemological scepticism as presented by poststructuralist theory: irony and relativism 
in its popular manifestation can easily become hedonistic and self-serving. Prevalent attitudes
seem not to reflect a spirit of critique but rather offer opportunities for the dismissal of politi-
cally unwelcome alternatives and the concentration of power with those who already exercise it.
In contrast, poststructuralist philosophy presents a form of relativism that is ethically committed. 
Which, that is, is not afraid to prescribe. The foundation of this form of relativism lies in a suspi-
cion of representational practices in toto. Indeed, representation is seen as a last resort, engaged 
in only when the potential benefits of representing outweigh potential harm.14 While this kind of 
vague principle is highly problematic and begs clarification from those looking for a rule to live 
by, the point is no less salient: if we simply give attention to weighing the pros and cons as we 
act, we will already have assumed responsibility for our actions.
Awareness of responsibility is as far as poststructuralist theory can take us when examined rig-
orously, yet that should be more than enough.
7
It is with regard to the details of sense-making that we might learn from historians. Where con-
sumers of history turn to its capacity for entertainment, historians seek similar satisfaction in 
a different way. From an idealised and abstract vantage point, historians would appear to be 
somewhat sad people. Underlying their work is a continuing desire for experience and contact, 
a never-satisfied phenomenological yearning (the very same “desire for presence” that Gumbre-
cht points to).15 The constant comparison of history to literature by theorists only serves to feed 
this desire with its emphasis on experience, reality and “presence” in one form or another. What 
needs to be done, then, is to find other ways of satisfying this desire for significance. Objectivity
and the consequent assumed contact with reality simply are not viable options. And – as I hope 
to have already suggested – nor is the creation of emotions through consumption; the presen-
tation of the past in ways intended to “move” and “touch” on the basis of their evoking easily rec-
ognisable and often somewhat excessive attitudes in readers. Instead, the stir and disturbance 
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created in readers by representations that cater to this desire should be seen for what they are: 
sublimations of the actual disruption or disjuncture glossed over with the kind of narrative that 
re-presents reality as appealing story.
The sense of significance that historians go to the past to find can, to me, be best examined in
terms of agency. Or simply – and perhaps a little unfairly – as disappointment or disillusionment 
with their experience of reality, even as an absence of contact with “life”. (Think of the stereotype
of the fuddled historian in the archive.) But what about theorists, then? The ones who cannot find 
that sense of significance in history, who come away from reading histories, let alone historical
documents, with a parallel sense of disappointment? Again, attending to agency seems to help
here. Obviously we all want what we do to feel significant and the experience of agency is crucial 
in ensuring just that. For “objectivist” historians and the rest of us, however, there is a marked
difference in what that agency is directed at, and from what it thus receives its confirmation and 
existence. The imagination these ideal historians possess – the “historical imagination”16 – is of 
a totally different kind: theirs is a traditionally scientific interest, engaging with puzzles and in-
vestigation for the sake of it. Because the past is real and there is a truth “out there” – even if it 
is obviously too complex to capture or comprehend – historians have a clear objective beyond, 
or, to be precise, (at least logically) antecedent to, representational practice. The imagination
and agency guiding the process of representation, on the other hand, is productive and forward-
oriented, not interested in puzzles but in form and effects. Significance here is much more de-
pendent on communication and approval. So, for “the historian” (someone primarily exercising
that particular kind of historical imagination), agency is felt in a relatively self-sufficient way, the
past provides a locus for its exercise independent of achievable effects. Others among us, how-
ever, view the past as a closed domain, with no room for interaction; hence experiencing agency 
requires more feedback than that provided by conversing with an imaginary subject (or, more 
specifically, a subject whose answers in the hermeneutic process are (re)constructed in and by
the imagination of the historian). Sense of agency comes, instead, from acting on the world we 
inhabit in our daily lives.
8
Having said all this, it needs to be pointed out that these objectivist historians – caricatured 
though they obviously are – seem to have the right end of the stick in one essential respect: 
History puts us face to face with another (an external agent) in a very particular way: although 
absent and unavailable to experience, the other is not abstract or imaginary in the sense it is in 
cinema, literature and philosophy, for instance. It is thus tempting to claim that history can jar 
us out of self-reflection in a purely private mode, forcing us to recognise both the nonsameness 
of the other to ourselves as well as the nonidentity of that otherness in terms of internal coher-
ent, continuous – or even contiguous – and determinable or fully exhaustible subject positions.17
Like the world in general, we are all intricate and inappropriable, and history – by which I mean 
representations committed to reality albeit with all the necessary caveats – shows this better 
than any other representational form; in part because it simultaneously denies communication.
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Conversely, the reason that films and novels, even quite bad ones, manage to hijack the imagina-
tion so effectively, results – at least for me – from the aesthetic and moral closure they effect.18
They leave little room for doubt, and, instead of presenting us with the other, they set us face to 
face with ourselves. In disturbing this moral closure, history – historical materials – can also be 
used to counter the ideological tendencies of narrative. Importantly, this is something that his-
torians can do by going with the grain and nature of their passion with the past instead of trying 
to imitate representational strategies designed for other genres.19
If this is true, if history is thus quite special in this way, what of the poststructuralist denial of 
representational practices? Doesn’t history sound much too desirable to be rejected on princi-
ple alone? In resolving this dilemma, theorists could, of course, simply take a page from Rich-
ard Rorty’s book and apply his argument concerning literature and philosophy to the writing of 
history. He writes: “The pursuit of private perfection is a perfectly reasonable aim for some writ-
ers . . . Serving human liberty is a perfectly reasonable aim for other writers . . . There is noth-
ing called ‘the aim of writing’ any more than there is something called ‘the aim of theorizing’.”20
Or indeed, we might continue, the “aim of history”. Importantly, even Rorty does not say that it is 
desirable to aim at nothing, however.
But what would this mean for a critical historiography? Should we leave justification for its exist-
ence to individual whim? Is critical historiography needed at all? (If it were intended as anything 
other than rhetorical, this question would have been asked at the beginning, of course.) Do his-
torians have responsibilities for the world as historians or can they simply concentrate on doing 
their work, whether the goal of that work is institutionally defined as the search for “truth” and
knowledge or as the entertainment and amusement of readers? The short answer, to me, is fully
in line with the existentialist and poststructuralist ethic: we are all equally responsible (or equally
culpable). The responsibilities of individuals are only magnified in their work when it influences 
the attitudes of others as it does in the case of historians. If and where the linguistic turn has 
made it impossible to hide behind veils of objectivity and method, it has brought this ethic to the 
fore. And if the only goal more objectively thinking historians can point to is the grudging admis-
sion that history brings meaning to their lives by fulfilling a desire for the real (not only through 
the fictional covering over of the linguistic abyss but also in the understanding and sense of sig-
nificance achieved), we should follow up on this as theorists. (Sadly the historian’s decision to get 
on with history and “understand” ultimately fails: a historian’s understanding is always incom-
plete since the past does not speak back. In this way the historical imagination easily becomes, 
for me, a self-indulgence as there is no affirmation of and no consequence to the communica-
tion – which is not to judge this kind of work as necessarily a private pursuit.)
9
So, the critical attitudes we need to develop go beyond source criticism and fidelity to profes-
sional practices.21 They will also have to sidestep some of the issues that the debate concerning 
representational form most often raises. History – or the realisation of any critical historiography 
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– will need to find strength in its epistemological concreteness while, at the same time, recog-
nising the fact that “the truth” is unattainable. In this, the role of representation regarding content 
needs to be admitted and studied in depth, but representation should at the same time be distin-
guished from a purely linguistic and literary process of meaning-construction. (Which is not to 
say that we can ever have access to meaning “behind” texts but rather that we can utilise paral-
lel situations and understandings in a going “beyond” of the text. For instance, when we read a 
poem, we need not – even in our role as historians – be limited to systematic decoding of textual
references, clues and structures but can also appreciate the physical and emotive responses it 
evokes, even to the extent of factoring these into our interpretation without fear of anachronism.)
While this may all sound like a digression from the question of what critical historiography can be, 
the importance of this kind of responsiveness should not be too hastily dismissed. It is not, after all, 
sensible to exclude intuitions from any “play” as long as that particular play is intended to involve 
something more than highly intellectualised word games. Instead, critical historiography needs 
to incorporate the whole scope of being human in its interpretive and communicative processes. 
And this entails still a further broadening in scope: appealing to the intentions behind a represen-
tation has been thoroughly discredited by textualist theory, especially in its more literary-oriented 
forms. It has been said that there is no reason to go “beyond” a text to search for meaning, and this 
has been, by and large, accepted by textualist theorising of history too. But this is not the direction 
that emphasis on linguistic construction needs to point us in. Instead, intentions (as provisional 
end-points to interpretive chains) can be recognised.22 More importantly, the obstacles historical 
materials create can also be accepted as indicators of contact with reality. Indeed, communication 
is possible in history only by foregrounding the “reality” and concreteness of history, and sense of 
purpose can be found only in a feeling of agency that is neither from the past nor present alone but 
from the disjuncture and discomfort of attempting to deal respectfully with both.
The “lesson” history teaches us is thus fundamentally that of respect. While this is a lesson we
are faced with daily in pragmatic endeavours – the basics of a Levinasian ethics and the encoun-
ter with another – such confrontation is absent from the reflective, linguistic–discursive world of 
academia, for instance. And without reminders, our intellectual discourse easily turns into “play” 
and entertainment.
10
To me, as I am sure for pretty much everyone, the impact of historical thinking on the oppor-
tunities of people living today should be central to any definition of critique in historical repre-
sentation. (And I know this has been said many times over by many people, but it remains a 
fundamental point of departure in my mind and cannot be emphasised enough.) As Beverley
Southgate eloquently argues, the answer to the question “What is history for?” can best be an-
swered in terms of the removal of exclusive and limiting (oppressive) structures – with exclu-
sion and dogmatism rather than imagination being the opposites of science. History’s being for
can thus be seen in terms of its “therapeutic function” for the individual and its moral use at the 
level of society.23
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At the same time, seeing history more as communication than representation would permit a 
significant rethinking of the current controversy between the historical imagination and prag-
matic interests. Further, a full recognition of the study of the past as a paradoxical communi-
cation without a subject would make more obvious the nature of history as self-reflective and 
future-oriented. This is clouded by the current emphasis on history as being “like literature”, as 
representation without an object; the epistemological difficulties of studying the past do need to 
be kept in mind, but continuing to emphasise the arbitrariness of interpretations in a situation 
where linguistic constructivism is already largely accepted only serves to prevent even that “pro-
visional halt to the process of interpretation” that Bevir suggests we allow for – despite whatev-
er theoretical discomfort this can cause. Postfoundationalist justifications for history need to be 
found in praxis, in terms of the tentative assumption that we do, after all, understand each other 
(as well as those paradoxical absent subjects) to an extent that makes communication possi-
ble. For history (as opposed to the study of the past) this means we need to recognise that com-
munication should have a subject and that subject needs to be taken into consideration in the 
arenas where it matters, not only in the shared ironic amusement we find in the “play” of read-
ings and in entertaining representations. It also means that we need to see that not only are all 
our engagements with the world equally linguistically constructed and thus subject to parallel
epistemological problems but that, despite this, history too must be kept among the vehicles of 
critical engagement. And, finally, that this is what we need historical theory for.
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